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In this article I examine one practice speakers have for confirming when confirma-
tion was not otherwise relevant. The practice involves a speaker repeating an asser-
tion previously made by another speaker in modified form with stress on the cop-
ula/auxiliary. I argue that these modified repeats work to undermine the first speaker’s
default ownership and rights over the claim and instead assert the primacy of the sec-
ond speaker’s rights to make the statement. Two types of modified repeats are identi-
fied: partial and full. Although both involve competing for primacy of the claim, they
occur in distinct sequential environments: The former are generally positioned after a
first claim was epistemically downgraded, whereas the latter are positioned follow-
ing initial claims that were offered straightforwardly, without downgrading.
Researchers of interaction have observed that speakers regularly re-
peat utterances that were previously produced by another speaker (cf.
Brown, 1998; Couper-Kuhlen, 1996; Jefferson, 1972; Keenan, 1977; Kim,
2002; Schegloff, 1996a, 1996b; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977;
Selting, 1996; Sorjonen, 1996; Tannen, 1989). The functions of these re-
peats, particularly in next turn, appear to cluster around initiating repair.
Whether and how an utterance is modified when it is produced the second
time is relevant for analyzing its action import. Couper-Kuhlen pointed out
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that repeats range along a cline “extending roughly from ‘perfect copy’ at
one extreme through ‘near copy’ at some intermediate stage to a mere
‘copy for all practical purposes’at the other extreme” (p. 368). By “perfect”
or less than perfect, Couper-Kuhlen was posing whether, within the verbal
(i.e., lexico-syntactic) channel, there is a complete and exact reduplication
of the words, a modified version or only a rough paraphrase. She made the
same argument for the many dimensions of prosody, which can be repro-
duced across a similar cline.
Although repeats are often vehicles for initiating repair (Kim, 2002,
2003; Schegloff et al., 1977; Selting, 1996; Sorjonen, 1996), they can also
function to sustain or direct a particular topical focus in conversation
(Brown, 1998; Keenan, 1977; Kim, 2002; Tannen, 1989), register receipt of
a prior turn at talk (Brown, 1998; Keenan, 1977; Kim, 2002; Schegloff,
1996b; Tannen, 1989), “target” a next action (Schegloff, 1996b), or do con-
firmation (Kim, 2002; Schegloff, 1996a).
In this article I focus on what I call “modified repeats” of assertions
made previously by another speaker. A key component of the modified re-
peat is that the copula/auxiliary is expanded and stressed in the repeat.1 In
what follows I begin by discussing agreement and confirmation. I then look
at two types of modified repeats—partial and full. I show that both types
are primarily concerned on one hand with confirming and thus aligning
with the claim and on the other hand with competing with the prior
speaker’s right to socioepistemic authority over the matter at hand. How-
ever, I show that the two types occur in somewhat different sequential envi-
ronments, and thus the means through which they compete for primacy
over the matter are somewhat different. Moreover, these confirmations do
not only occur in environments where confirmation is a conditionally rele-
vant next action. I discuss each type of modified repeat in turn.
DATA AND METHOD
The data on which this analysis is based are audio and video record-
ings of naturally occurring spontaneous social interaction in a range of dif-
ferent social contexts. The analysis relies on conversation analysis (CA) as
a methodology. CA embodies a theory of social interaction that views in-
teraction as systematic, rule guided, and practice oriented, and thus as a do-
main that can be investigated for its underlying mechanics (for reviews see
Heritage, 1984b; Levinson, 1983). The theory assumes that no detail of
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communication can be discounted a priori as random or arbitrary. This arti-
cle follows in the CA tradition. Here, I attempt to add to the existing corpus
of descriptions of actions (Schegloff, 1996a) as part of a larger collective
effort to build an empirical theory of social action.
ANALYSIS
Agreement
It appears to matter to conversational participants (a) if they are the
first or the second person to make a claim and (b) whether and who has su-
perior versus subordinate rights to make a particular claim. First-position
assertions (whether descriptions or assessments) carry an implied claim
that the speaker has primary epistemic rights over the claim (Heritage,
2002). Due to the sequential organization of conversation, second asser-
tions will always be heard as having been positioned relative to the first and
thus relative in terms of epistemics as well. Whereas asserting something
can be done in either first or second position (including a second-position
assertion that works to overcome its “secondness”), agreement is intrinsi-
cally a second action as, by definition, it aligns with a previously taken po-
sition. Because of this, agreements do not claim to have previously had a
position on whatever they agree with at that moment. However, different
practices for doing agreement have different consequences for the in-
progress interaction. As Heritage and Raymond (2005) observed, par-
ticipants are oriented to the “terms of agreement” as consequential to the
ongoing interaction. Perhaps the most neutral form of agreement is accom-
plished by some form of “Yes” because with “yes,” a speaker does just
agreement. In particular, with “yes” the speaker makes no claim to have
previously held a position on the topic or to have either independent or pri-
mary rights over the claim. For instance, see Extract 1. Here Lateisha, Tim,
and Joe are discussing a recent news story about a man who killed his family.
(1) HS 4 T208
1 LAT: They was his babies that he killed?
2 TIM: I think so.
3 JOE: =Y[eah:.
4 TIM: [(It was) his babies.
5 (.)
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6 TIM: All of ’em.
7 ((intervening talk about killings))
8 JOE: (Two) months, ((age of child))
9 (0.2)
10 JOE: (Three) months,
11 (.)
12 TIM: Go:d they don’t know [(^nothin’)
13 JOE: -> [That’s an infant.
14 TIM: => Ye^a:h.
At line 13 Joe asserts that a baby of only 2 or 3 months of age is an infant.
Tim agrees with Joe through a prosodically emphatic “Ye^a:h” in line 14.
Similarly, see Extract 2. Here Linda assesses Craig’s hair as “startin’ tuh
look better.” In line 2, Joan agrees with this, with “Ye:a:h.”
(2) TC Linda & Joan (TCIc-side 2)
1 Lin: -> Craig’s hair rilly wz startin’ tuh look better.
2 Joa: => Ye:a:h.
A third case is shown in Extract 3. In line 2, Serena agrees with Katie’s as-
sessment from line 1.
(3) Sorority breakfast 1 4:20
1 KAT: -> He was quite uncomfortable.
2 SER: => Yeah.
3 SER: I’d say:_
In Extracts 1 through 3, speakers do agreement but no more. Although the
respondents here do align, they are, in Heritage’s (2002) terms, “vulnerable
to the inference that their response is fabricated on the instant to achieve
agreement or disagreement, and is thus a dependent or even a coerced ac-
tion within a field of constraint that is established by the first” (p. 200). This
is specifically wrestled with by Serena in Extract 3, line 3 when she reas-
serts agreement with “I’d say:” where, with the stress on “I”, she works to
emphasize that this is not bland or “mere” agreement.
In contrast with bland agreements such as “Yeah,” agreements that are
prefaced by “Oh” convey a “change of state of orientation” and systemati-
cally indicate that the speaker has both independent access to and a previ-
ously held position on the matter (Heritage, 2002). As an example, see Ex-
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tract 4. Here, a family is talking about the city planning in Madeline’s town.
Following Madeline’s assessment that it would be “far more dangerous” to
walk or ride a bicycle in her town, Jenny aligns with an “Oh” prefaced
agreement (line 3).
(4) Beach house 16:10
1 MAD: And if I wanted tuh wa:lk, (.) or ride uh bicycle it
2 would be far more dangerous [because there are no bike=
3 JEN: [Oh of cou:rse. No-
4 MAD: =lanes and no walking lanes.=
Here the “epistemic independence” (Heritage, 2002) is doubly marked be-
cause it is “Oh” prefaced and the agreement token is “of cou:rse.” which
underscores Jenny’s position as previously held, even if occasioned in this
instance as a second. Heritage noted that “Oh” prefaced agreements are
most frequent in contexts where the second speaker has primary rights in
the matter at hand; however, the practice does not in and of itself assert pri-
mary rights but rather claims epistemic independence (Heritage, 2002).
Confirmation
Bland agreements neither convey nor claim that the speaker had a pre-
viously held position on the matter at hand; further, they can be either re-
quested by a first speaker or offered unsolicited by a second speaker. By
contrast, confirmations are most commonly positioned following requests
for confirmation by a first speaker. That is, with declarative questions,
B-event statements (Labov & Fanshel, 1977), and negative interrogatives,
speakers take a particular stance toward the claim that makes relevant con-
firmation or disconfirmation. For instance, see the declarative question in
Extract 5. It is confirmed by Mark in line 4.
(5) Ravioli dinner
1 Mark: I don’t like thuh bean one.
2 (2.0)
3 Kim: -> This is the bean one?
4 Mark: => Mm hm,
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Similarly, in Extract 6, two couples have been talking about John’s having
taken a course to quit smoking. In the course they showed films about what
smoking does to the lungs. In the extract, Don makes a B-event statement in
line 16, “They just- just give you that bit of support.”, an extension of the
claim made in lines 11 to 13 that the films and the course did not do a lot to
help John because he already was very determined. This is a B-event state-
ment that makes relevant confirmation by John (Labov & Fanshel, 1977)
and receives this confirmation in line 19.
(6) Chinese dinner
1 ANN: Did it sc[a:re you::? ((about the films))
2 JOH: [.unhh
3 JOH: No: it didn’t.
4 ANN: Oh [:.
5 JOH: [Tha’wz the funny thi:ng,
6 BET: But it still helped t[uh reinforce yer determination=
7 JOH: [It didn’ bo:ther me,
8 BET: =(thi[s way or tha:t,)
9 JOH: [No: it dih-it didn’ really (relate[d tuh [ )
10 TER: [(I’nna [go Mommy)
11 DON: [The point is
12 you wouldn’t take that course if you weren’t determined in the
13 first[place.
14 TER: [(I’m nna [go mo: [my)
15 JOH: [Mm hm, [
16 DON: [They ju[st- just give you that=
17 ANN: [Well,
18 DON: =bit of support.
19 JOH: -> Th’t’s right.
Both of these cases show confirmations in sequential locations where the
confirmation was relevant because it was either requested (Extract 5) or se-
quentially implicated (Extract 6). In both cases, both participants treat the
confirming party as having greater epistemic authority over the matter. The
first speaker does this by performing an action that seeks confirmation, and
the second speaker does this by confirming in the manner that they do
“Yes” or “Th’t’s right.”. By contrast, another type of confirmation, “con-
firming an allusion” (Schegloff, 1996a), appears primarily concerned with
which participant has primary rights to state something. In this practice, a
speaker articulates something that had previously been alluded to by a prior
speaker. In doing so, the speaker seeks confirmation of the assertion. For
instance, see Extract 7.
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(7) Menzies, farmers’ market: air plant merchant and a customer (Schegloff, 1996,
p. 208)
1 Liz: Hi::
2 Cus: I want to ask you something.
3 Liz: Sure
4 Cus: [I bought three of those uh you know like ( )
5 Cus: [((pointing to tray of plants))
6 Cus: One of them died out.
7 ((gap))
8 Cus: Uhh
9 Liz: It did,
10 Cus: Yeah
11 Liz: -> The other ones are doing well,
12 Cus: => The other ones are doing well.
13 Liz: They were all in the same area,
14 Cus: Same thing, yeah.
Here, as Schegloff (1996b) analyzed, the customer asserts that one of his
three plants died (line 6). Through this, he implies, but does not state, that
the other two plants are still alive. It is understanding precisely this infor-
mation that Liz makes explicit with her candidate in line 11. This assertion,
by virtue of its B-event status, makes relevant confirmation (Labov &
Fanshel, 1977). The customer confirms the prior with a full repeat in line
12.2 By doing the confirmation with a full repeat rather than a “Yes” or
“That’s right” the speaker highlights that this is a claim which is within his
domain and which he has primary rights to make.
When confirmation is not explicitly being sought by an interlocutor but
is nonetheless offered from second position, then this can be seen as a com-
petitive move, competitive in terms of asserting epistemic authority over the
claim or competitive in terms of asserting primary rights to make the claim or
undercutting the authority or primary rights of the first speaker. In this article
I argue that modified repeats are a practice that, similar to confirming allu-
sions, display the speaker to be concerned with having primary rights to
make the claim as evidenced by the redoing of the claim. However, unlike the
practice used to confirm an allusion, speakers of modified repeats make use
of syntactic and prosodic resources to highlight that the claim is being done
as a second; moreover, these confirmations are offered when confirmation
was not sequentially implicated. For these reasons, I argue that modified re-
peats are also concerned to compete with the epistemic authority of the
claim. Thus, unlike other forms of confirmation, which appear to be primar-
ily concerned either with epistemic rights or with epistemic authority, this
practice appears to be dealing with both of these dimensions.
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Modified Repeats
As an initial instance of a modified repeat, see Extract 8. Although I
return to this case for a fuller analysis shortly, here I mean only to point out
some of the differences between this practice and others shown so far in
this article. Note that Tim’s assertion in line 1 (“it was some black folks”)
does not make relevant a confirmation, although one is provided in line 3.
(8) HS4 7-9-03 T1 59:46 ((simplified))
1 TIM: A-> I think it was some black folks
2 cuz you see(n) ’em on (thuh TV)
3 JOE: C-> It was.
Also, Joe’s confirmation repeats the “it was” from Tim’s prior claim but
adds stress to the “was”, which allows it to be heard as doing confirmation
and specifically as a second.
The sequential position of this practice is significant because when
speakers make an assertion in first position, they claim primary rights to
make that assertion. This is true whether they assert the claim straightfor-
wardly (see Extracts 1, 3, 4, and 6), assert it with intensification (see Ex-
tract 2), or even make use of epistemic downgrading such as “I think” (Ex-
tract 8), “It looks like”, “Apparently”, and so on. Part of the evidence for
this is that, except for claims about the addressee (“B-event statements”),
nonassessment assertions do not make confirmation conditionally relevant.
Thus, these assertions differ from utterances that solicit confirmation (Ex-
tracts 5–7). Although agreement or acknowledgment is common following
assertions, when a next speaker confirms a prior assertion, this is a marked
action.
Partial modified repeats. Partial modified repeats are most commonly
done in environments where the first claim was offered with epistemic
downgrading. Whereas unmarked agreements in this environment both
preserve the indefiniteness of the claim and take no position on whether or
which participant has primary rights to make the claim, modified repeats
typically address both of these dimensions. First they generally do not re-
peat any downgrading that was done in the original claim; second, through
repetition (whether partial as discussed here or full as discussed later) and
stress on the copula/auxiliary, modified repeats are specifically positioned
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as “seconds” to some prior saying. However, partial modified repeats do
not merely second a prior claim. Rather, they at least compete with and of-
ten assert epistemic authority over it through the features just outlined. One
of the most common means through which they assert authority is through
a claim of primary rights to have made the claim, and this in turn is often
grounded in the interactional role of the speaker. Modified repeats there-
fore typically involve both alignment between the speakers (in terms of
agreement on a particular description or assessment) and competitiveness
between them (in terms of primary rights to make and authority over the
claim). This is true even in partial modified repeats where first speakers
typically mitigate their claim to primacy with downgrades.
Partial modified repeats can thus be characterized as pro-termed re-
peats of the first claim (i.e., they rely on anaphora to redo the claim), which
reassert the prior claim with stress on the copula/auxiliary. I focus on affir-
mative examples, but modified repeats also appear in negative assertions,
although less commonly.
An example of a partial repeat was shown in Extract 8. There, in a bar-
ber shop, Tim and Joe have been discussing a widely reported incident
where a woman left her two children in a car in southern California during a
hot summer day and both children died. Joe had topicalized this and further
had been the one who was retelling the incident and expressing disbelief
over the details and claims offered by the mother. It is in this context that
Tim claims something about the incident—that the people involved in the
incident were Black. However, he downgrades his own rights to primacy
over the claim in two ways: first, with “I think” as a qualifier; and second,
with the account “cuz you see(n) ’em on (thuh TV).”3 In response, Joe con-
firms Tim’s assertion with a partial modified repeat: “It was”. The repeat
involves the use of anaphora, which requires Tim to return to his initial
claim to make sense of Joe’s turn, but note that this is still expanded and
marked relative to mere agreements such as “Yes”. Unlike Tim’s claim,
Joe’s repeat both cleanses the assertion of the qualifications on it in Tim’s
turn and further collaborates with Tim’s stance that he has subordinate
rights to make the claim by asserting his own authority over the story and
its details. In addition to collaborating with Tim’s diminished epistemic
rights to the claim, by confirming in this way (i.e., with a modified repeat)
in this position (i.e., when confirmation was not conditionally relevant) Joe
can be understood to actively undermine Tim’s claimed primacy over the
assertion. Here we see that for Joe it is not only about positioning himself
as in agreement with Tim but also about their respective positioning within
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that agreement: the terms of their agreement (Heritage & Raymond, 2005).
In particular, here the terms that are important have to do with epistemic au-
thority over the matters that are part of the telling. Thus, although at one
level Tim and Joe align in terms of who has primary rights to make the
claim, on another level, that Tim says it first sequentially claims primacy
despite it being mitigated against with the account, and Joe quarrels with
this through his modified repeat.
As another example, see Extract 9. Here, three housemates in their mid
20s are preparing dinner together. Lance is making hamburger patties out
of raw beef, and Judy is known as someone who will eat bits of raw meat
but is considered strange for doing so. Here at line 1 Lance comments that
the meat smells so good that he might do the same thing.
(9) Housemates 2:30




5 LAN: Yeah but I’m not [that weird.]
6 GIO: [I th(h)ink ] it’s just all the spices.
7 (0.2)
8 LAN: It is.
Gio, the third housemate who is preparing food with Lance and Judy, as-
serts that the meat is smelling good because of all the spices (line 6). Simi-
lar to Extract 8, here Gio also downgrades his own rights to make the claim
with the qualifier “I th(h)ink”, here produced through a laughing outbreath.
Lance confirms Gio’s assertion with the partial modified repeat “It is.”
(line 8).
When Lance confirms Gio’s assertion with a modified repeat, he
aligns with Gio about the spices causing the meat to smell good. However,
similar to Extract 8, Lance’s repeat simultaneously competes with the pri-
macy that Gio claims simply by virtue of being the first to make the asser-
tion. This mixture of alignment and competitiveness is also present in that
the repeat does not include the epistemic downgrade that was present in
Gio’s first production. With the modified repeat, Lance asserts epistemic
authority over whether it is the spices that make the meat smell good. Here,
the authority appears to be derived from a claim of primary rights to assert
what smells good to him. That is, because the topic is Lance’s own sense of
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smell, Lance has primary rights to assess whether this is what makes the
meat smell good. Thus, the argument is that through this claim of primacy,
Lance also hearably claims epistemic authority from second position with
the modified repeat. Also like Extract 8 then, the larger issues involved
have to do with the relative social positioning of the interactants and thus
with the terms of their agreement and not only with whether they are in
agreement.
The first two cases suggest that through their confirmations, speakers
index their own primary rights to have made the claim originally offered by
the first speaker. Although the confirmation does not explicitly connect the
grounds for the primary rights and ultimately for greater epistemic author-
ity, the confirmation communicates to the recipient (the first speaker) that
he or she can and should locate the grounds for these primary rights.
Typically these grounds are either the speaker’s role as an interactant (such
as that of teller in Extract 8) or their social role (such as that of teacher or
the person who has experienced the relevant event) as in Extract 9. In this
way the interactants are oriented to who is “the right person” to make a
given assertion.4 In a third example, a family is talking about city planning
in southern California and the difficulty of using any mode of transporta-
tion other than cars. Madeline has been talking about her town—that there
are no bike lanes or pedestrian lanes and that even if there were, there is
nothing nearby that she could walk or bike to. It is in this environment that
her mother Margot asserts that biking would be difficult up the hill on
which Madeline lives (line 8).
(10) Beach house 16:10
1 MAD: And if I wanted tuh wa:lk, (.) or ride uh bicycle it
2 would be far more dangerous[because there are no bike=
3 JEN: [Oh of cou:rse. No-
4 MAD: =lanes and no walkin[g lanes.=
5 JEN: [(for [safety.)
6 MAR: [(well-)
7 MAD: Huh huh huh huh huh
8 MAR: It would be [hard tuh- tuh bike (.) up on your hill.
9 MAD: [((sniff))
10 (0.2)
11 MAD: Well it would be.
Again, by virtue of sequential position, Margot claims primary rights to the
claim. However, she mitigates against this default primacy by marking the
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initial assertion (line8)asspeculativewith themodal“would”.Further,own-
ership of the hill is firmly placed with Madeline through the possessive
“your”, which further diminishes Margot’s rights to make claims on this
topic (Labov&Fanshel, 1977). In response,Madelineconfirmswith“Well it
wouldbe.”5 Similar toothermodified repeats,Madelineboth repeatsMargot’s
claim and stresses the modal auxiliary “would”. In the way she confirms
Margot’s assertion she makes her own claim that the assertion is appropriately
within her domain and that she has primary rights to make it. It is through her
ownprimary rights to theclaimthat I alsoarguesheassertsepistemicauthority
to assess whether or not it would be difficult to bike up the hill.
A final example offers evidence that the roots of primacy may not al-
ways be self-evident, although the partial modified repeat nonetheless in-
dexes a claim of epistemic authority and leaves the interlocutor to locate
the grounds on which a claim of primary rights would rest. Here, a hairstyl-
ist and his client are talking about creativity and success. The stylist is an
Asian man whose dialect clearly reflects him to be a non-native speaker of
English. Thus both his ethnicity and his language are available to the client
as indices of his status as an immigrant to the United States. The client is an
older White woman whose dialect suggests her to be a native speaker of
American English. In line 1, the stylist asserts that “it take talent and hard
wor:k to be successful.” The client confirms this using a partial repeat of
the stylist’s utterance.
(11) HS2: 23:57
1 STY: And I work very hard so_ (1.0) It take t- it take
2 talent and hard wor:k to be successful.
3 CLI: >.ml< It do^es.
As in earlier cases, the modified repeat involves the client repeating the as-
sertion using anaphora and emphasizing the do-auxiliary. As in earlier
cases, this works to undermine the stylist’s authority over the claim be-
cause, as before, the first assertion did not make confirmation relevant, but
here the client is doing confirmation by reasserting the claim and under-
scoring it as an assertion. The question, as in other cases like this, is what
the client is doing given that, unlike Extracts 8 to 10, the grounding for her
primary rights over this claim is a bit less transparent.
The analysis offered is that the client treats the stylist as offering a gen-
eralization about American culture. Talent and hard work are what it takes
to be successful in the United States, and it is rhetoric that is familiar, even
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stereotypically provided, to immigrants. The claim to epistemic authority
over this assertion likely underscores the client as an American who would
know about her country and who would have primary rights to make claims
about what it takes to be successful there. When the client responds with a
partial modified repeat, she undermines the first speaker’s primary rights to
make the claim by claiming authority over the claim and indexing herself
as having primary rights to make it. What this claim to primacy is rooted in
is left to the stylist to determine. This is no different from other cases we
have seen except that the roots of the claim to primacy may be less transpar-
ent in cases such as this. In addition, unlike other cases, here the partici-
pants do not align in terms of these rights because the first speaker does not
attempt to downgrade his epistemic stance relative to the claim. This was
unusual in the collection of cases.
To summarize, we observed that partial modified repeats are used as a
way to do confirmation, a fundamentally aligning action. However, this ac-
tion is done in a sequential environment where it was not requested and
thus is a marked action in terms of its position. It is further marked in form
because it is not a minimal “Yes” type response but is rather a repeating of a
prior assertion. Specifically, the repeat involves a redoing of the original
claim relying heavily on anaphora. This redoing emphasizes the second
speaker’s claim to have primary rights to make the assertion. In addition, it
involves stressing the already present auxiliary or expanding or adding the
copula/auxiliary and stressing that component. It has been argued that this
stress emphasizes the claim as second and thereby emphasizes its claim to
epistemic authority as well. In most cases, partial modified repeats are po-
sitioned in sequential environments where first speakers had downgraded
their rights to make the claim. Thus, on one level the two speakers are
aligned, but on another the second speaker is competing with the first
speaker’s claim to primacy by virtue of their claim having been made in
first position and through that asserting epistemic authority over the claim.
There may be a variety of reasons why it would matter to the partici-
pants whether one has the upper hand over a particular state of affairs. As
mentioned earlier, this may have to do with an interactional role (e.g., teller
or recipient) or it may have to do with a social role (e.g., teacher, doctor, or
otherwise expert over a domain). And these reasons are not generally made
explicit by speakers for hearers. Rather, the use of this marked practice for
doing confirmation in an environment where it was not a conditionally rele-
vant next action communicates to hearers that they can and should properly
look for an account for this claim to primacy.
Modified Repeats 143
Full modified repeats. Full modified repeats are qualitatively simi-
lar to partial modified repeats, as stated earlier, in that they both involve
confirming a just prior claim by asserting it again and by expanding and/or
stressing the copula or auxiliary. In both cases, confirmation was not neces-
sarily made conditionally relevant by the prior assertion. However, full
modified repeats differ from partial modified repeats in several critical
ways. First, and most obviously, whereas partial repeats only reproduce the
most minimal portion of the claim to be understood as a redoing and to do
confirmation and do so relying primarily on anaphora making them highly
parasitic on the prior turn, full modified repeats reproduce the core claim.
Recall the cline outlined by Couper-Kuhlen (1996) in the introduction. As
she pointed out, repetition can vary along a cline toward more precise repe-
tition both in terms of lexicon and prosody. Full repeats involve a much
higher position along this cline, as they repeat more of the initial claim and
are therefore less parasitic on the initial claim.
This then brings us to the second primary difference between the two
types of modified repeats: Whereas partial modified repeats typically occur
in environments where speakers of the initial claim have displayed subordi-
nate rights to make the claim, full modified repeats respond to assertions
that straightforwardly, both by virtue of the design of the turn and its posi-
tion, claim primary rights to make the claim. In this way, although both
types of modified repeats are competitive over the primacy of the claim,
full modified repeats may be more competitive because they occur in se-
quential environments where speakers of the initial claim do not generally
downgrade their claims to primacy.
As a first instance, see Extract 12. Here, Robbie has recently taken
over as the teacher for a class of children Lesley had previously taught.
Robbie assesses them at lines 2 to 3 with “the children’re lovely”. Lesley
responds to this in line 5 first with an “Oh” prefaced agreement. Heritage
(2002) argued that through the “oh” prefaced agreement, Lesley conveys
that this opinion had been arrived at previously and independently from
Robbie’s bringing it up here.
(12) Holt 5/88:1:5:4
1 ROB: Oh I’m such a ^so: gla:d t’have a chat with you cz
2 I ^do want t’know’n I’m en^joying it ’n the children’re
3 love[ly.
4 LES: [.tch
5 LES: ^Oh yes.=They ^are lovely:: I[h if a little exciteable.
6 ROB: [( )
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7 ROB: Th[a:t’s w’t I thought. I’ave ^thirty in that roo- I=
8 LES: [Hm:.
9 ROB: =do:. sympathize with you.
Subsequent to this agreement, Lesley does a modified repeat of Robbie’s
assessment: “They ^are lovely::”, which repeats the full first claim “the
children’re lovely” modifying only the initial full reference from “the
children” to the anaphoric reference “they”. Thus, she maintains the key
assessment term “lovely.”. This is redundant and thus may be hearable as
doing something that is not “simply agreeing” (Levinson, 2000). As is
characteristic of modified repeats, the copula “are” is expanded and
stressed shifting from the contracted “’re” to ^are”. This action confirms
what Robbie has said both by repeating what Robbie had said—the same
basic assessment—and by emphasizing the copula. In this way, although
the action is positioned as a second, it is designed to override the first.
Leslie claims to have primary rights to assess the children and through
that claims greater epistemic authority to do this. She recasts Robbie’s
assessment in this way as having less authority than Robbie had origi-
nally claimed (note that there is no downgrading of the original claim by
Robbie in lines 2–3). That Lesley is claiming to have more rights than
Robbie is further supported in what she does in her next Turn Construc-
tional Unit (TCU)—qualify her assessment with “if a little exciteable.”
This qualification of the assessment now reasserts the primacy of her
own assessment by further transforming her second-position assessment
into a first-position assessment to be aligned with (or not) by Robbie.
This case also supports a claim that although independent agreement and
primary rights may not always be separable for participants, they cer-
tainly can be separated, and both dimensions appear to be oriented to by
interactants.
As another example, see Extract 13. Here, as a protest of the teacher’s
request that a student do a particular task, the student (a female child)
claims to the teacher that the task was for another student. With the past
tense, the girl asserts at least that a prior decision had placed this task with
another student. Further, the assertion “That was Alison’s job” does not ori-
ent to her own diminished rights to make this claim. Her first TCU, as
Schegloff (1996a) analyzed, includes a change-of-state token (Heritage,
1984a) followed by an overt confirmation of the girl’s assertion. In addi-
tion, as suggested by the change-of-state token “Oh” in the turn “Oh that’s
right.”, “that’s right” may index that the facts in the assertion have been re-
membered (Heritage, 1984a, 1998). This portion of the turn effectively
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credits the child with reminding her while asserting the independence of
her own memory of the fact.
(13) Schegloff (1996a, p. 176)
1 TEA: Check and see if there’s any down on the
2 bottom that people forgot to hang up.
3 GIR: That was Alison’s job.
4 TEA: Oh that’s right. It is Alison’s job.
5 GIR: A:lison! ((Calling out for her))
In the second TCU of the turn, the teacher confirms the girl’s claim
and, through her use of the present tense, renews the prior decision that the
job belongs properly to Alison. Through her modified repeat the teacher as-
serts herself to have primary rights to the claim that it is Alison’s job. Al-
though the change in tense from “was” to “is” with the emphasis on “is” in
another context might be doing correction, in this case, the shift in tense ap-
pears concerned not so much with correcting as with extending the rele-
vance of the confirmation. The stress also works to emphasize her claim of
epistemic authority over the matter. Her social roles—teacher versus stu-
dent; adult versus child—appear to be indexed in the teacher’s claim of au-
thority. This is shown to be at issue for the participants by the fact that the
contingent next action—calling Alison to perform the task—is not done
until after the reassertion. But notice as well that it is the child who does the
summoning once the action has the authority of the teacher behind it.
Across all the cases we have seen, whether what is indexed is the second
speaker’s interactional or social role, the underlying issue appears to be the
same: How are these people to position themselves relative to one another
with respect to the current claim about some state of affairs.
Another example is shown in Extract 14. Here again, housemates are
preparing dinner. Judy has proposed drinking red wine, and Lance has
agreed to the proposal but in lines 3 to 4 and 6 teasingly adds a condition. In
overlap with the last component of this tease, Gio asserts as an additional
issue “it’s uh school night.” (line 7). Of importance, Lance has already
taken a position that Judy should restrict her drinking. Gio’s assertion, par-
ticularly with the And-preface, attaches his claim to Lance and is poten-
tially hearable as stepping into Lance’s domain by asserting why Judy
should be careful with her drinking. In addition, Gio’s assertion is rather
hypocritical because he just had two shots of Jack Daniel’s whisky and pre-
viously told this to the others. After 1.0 sec of silence Lance confirms this
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by fully reasserting “It is a school night.” (line 9). Once again, the full mod-
ified repeat is positioned following a claim that was offered straightfor-
wardly without any epistemic downgrades; it involves a repeat of the full




3 LAN: .h As long as you don’t have too much.= “cuz
4 you remember what happen’=las’=time.”
5 GIO: h [h(h)
6 LAN: [(Got chel got [°drunk didn’ sh- )
7 GIO: [An’ it’s uh school night.
8 (1.0)
9 LAN: It is a school night.
10 (0.4)
11 LAN: Mister- <two jacks already,>
After Gio’s claim, Lance initially says nothing. During the 1.0 sec of si-
lence at line 8, he continues the same food preparation activity he was en-
gaged in earlier: molding hamburger patties. By repeating Gio’s claim after
1.0 sec of silence, Lance communicates both that he “thought” about it and
that he arrived at that conclusion as well. This is one way that he under-
mines Gio’s rights to make such a claim because the repeat retroactively
casts Gio as having lesser rights than were claimed by his own turn design
(which was straightforward with no epistemic downgrading). As with other
cases we have seen, by confirming the assertion in this way Lance treats
himself as having primary rights to the matter, through the reassertion of
the claim, and as having greater epistemic authority through the reliance on
stress to emphasize the claim in second position as doing confirmation of a
claim that the second speaker had primary rights to make.
That relative rights over the claim are at issue is further evidenced in
the second TCU of Lance’s turn (line 11). The increment (Schegloff, 2000)
“Mister- <two jacks already,>”, makes reference to Gio’s drinking of Jack
Daniel’s that evening. This increment is an address term relying on “Mis-
ter” to be heard as such. With it, Lance addresses Gio in such a way that he
is characterized as an inappropriate person to be taking a moralistic stance
on drinking alcohol on a weeknight. In this way Lance further reinforces
his own claim to having primary rights to make such an assertion. Here,
those rights appear to be two-pronged: First, he had earlier implied that
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Judy should not drink too heavily that evening; second, Gio is in a compro-
mised moral position to give reasons for not drinking “too much.”
Another example is shown in Extract 15. Here, Dixie has been com-
plaining about one of her aerobics instructors who, like others she has had,
will stop working out during the class and stand “pretending <to watch us,>”
(line 7). She then assesses this as “infuriating”. In response to this telling, her
husband, Sam, states “That’s thuh way thee instr-ructors cheat” (line 9).
Dixie partially repeats this assertion in line 11 with “It i^s.” She then redoes
Sam’sentire turndoinga full repeat. “It is thuhway theycheat”.This shift ap-
pears tobe related to the fact that the latter is a strongerway toassert authority
in an environment where the first speaker did not orient to his or her own
subordinate rights to make the claim.6 The full repeat is offered in a charac-
teristic sequential environment, where the first assertion had been produced
straightforwardly without epistemic downgrading. Further, it involves a full
repeat of the claim with an expanded and stressed copula.
(15) Stew dinner 38:15
1 DIX: They’ll ^stop. (.) they’ll stop doing it and stand there
2 and call it for you.
3 SAM: Mm hm:,
4 DIX: Like she’s trying to catch her brea:th, or
5 (.)
6 SAM: Uh [huh,
7 DIX: [she’s pretending <to watch us,> .hh that is
8 infuriating.
9 SAM: That’s thuh way thee instr-ructors cheat.
10 (0.2)
11 DIX: It i^s. It is thuh way they cheat and [it’s infuriating=
12 SAM: [Mm:.
13 DIX: =to me cuz it (makes them think-) ya know she
14 thinks she’s coo:l an’ checking out on us an’
15 everything_<.h an’ uhm (0.4) it’s very frustrating.
By confirming with a full modified repeat (line 11), Dixie treats herself as
having primary rights to make the claim. Her emphasis on this as a redoing
of the original claim also works to underscore her assertion of greater
epistemic authority. This is further supported in the way that she continues
her turn in a way that co-opts her husband’s turn and syntactically builds on
it (with “and”), recompleting the turn with her own prior turn completion
(“it’s infuriating”).
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Sam’s claim about the instructor’s behavior is hearably aligning in that
it displays his empathy with the situation through a possible upshot of
Dixie’s prior turn. However, it also implicitly claims primary rights to
make the assertion through its first position. Sam can be said to have equal
rights to observe and make claims about aerobics instructors insofar as
Dixie’s claim was a generic one and both parties take aerobics classes. But
this is Dixie’s telling, and thus through her interactional role it is her knowl-
edge domain. Further, with “pretending”, Dixie had already conveyed a po-
sition that the instructor was using “watching” as a cover for not exercising.
Although she had not stated that it was cheating, she had implied this.
When Sam asserts that this is the way instructors cheat, he claims “first-
ness” and, by virtue of this sequential position, primary rights to make this
assertion. By redoing the claim with a modified repeat, Dixie undermines
Sam’s rights and works to reclaim primacy over the matter and further,
through the emphasis on the claim, asserts epistemic authority over it.
Another instance is shown in Extract 16. Here three people are dis-
cussing gun control laws. Jason initiates a brief description of the gun con-
trol policy in the Netherlands. This description reaches its first possible
completion point at the end of line 4, as this is the first point where a fact
that could be assessed as interesting is syntactically and prosodically possi-
bly complete. With no uptake, Jason continues by expanding on the point
he has already made. This next reaches possible completion at the end of
line 7. After a slight delay, Margot begins to respond (line 10). This re-
sponse is relatively minimal and continuative (particularly the “Yeah”).
Further, Jason is gazing at Madeline across Margot’s response and thus ap-
pears to be pursuing response from Madeline.
(16) Beach house 21:15
1 JAS: W’ll in the Netherlands: (.) thuh gun laws are
2 interesting_ uhm (.) You c’n ow:n: (.) uh rifle or shotgun?,
3 (0.2)
4 JAS: But you’re not allowed tuh take it home with you.
5 (0.5)
6 JAS: Uhm (.) Basically: if you buy uh rifle or shotgun? it-
7 You hafta keep it (.) <at a shooting range.>
8 (.)
9 JAS: [((gaze to MAD))
10 MAR: [Tha- Yeah[Oh:.
11 JAS: [and you can go to thuh shooting range
12 JAS: and use it.
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13 (.)
14 JAS: at thuh shooting range. but it [stays there.
15 MAD: [Mm hm,
16 MAD: Hm. ((nodding))
17 MAD: Mm hm, ((nodding))
18 JAS: [So it’s kind of interesting.
19 MAD: [(So it’s -)
20 MAD: That is interesting.
Jason pursues Madeline’s response across lines 11 to 14. He again reaches
possible completion at the end of line 12. This is recompleted saying much
the same thing with the increment in line 14. Apparently targeting the com-
pletion of Jason’s next TCU, Madeline offers a continuer in partial overlap
with it—itself a recompletion and one that again makes the same point
made in line 4 and again at lines 6 to 7. The continuer treats Jason as not yet
done. Following the TCU completion of line 14, Madeline nods and offers
a minimal response token “Hm.” followed by “Mm hm,” which is equivo-
cal as an agreement or a continuer. None of these responses fully takes up
Jason’s telling as interesting or even as complete. Jason had prefaced his
telling with a characterization of the description as “interesting”. This char-
acterization at the outset of the description communicates to the recipient
both what type of response would be appropriate to the description and
when it will be over—when something “interesting” has been mentioned
(Sacks, 1974).
In this sequential environment, Jason explicitly offers a candidate re-
sponse to his own telling. It is hearable as a response that “should” have been
offered by a recipient, evidenced first by the turn-initial upshot marker “So”.
Furthermore, he uses the very same framing he used in lines 1 to 2 to project
the typeof telling itwouldbe—areturn to thebeginningof the telling isaway
to communicate that the end has been reached (Jefferson, 1978; Schegloff, in
press). The response is a first-position assertion that assesses the gun laws as
“kind of interesting.” (line 18). Madeline confirms the basic claim with a full
modified repeat of the assertion (line 20). Similar to the other cases, the cop-
ula is expanded and stressed. In this case, there is a deictic shift from “it” to
“that”. Although Jason had downgraded his assessment of the description
from “interesting” to “kind of interesting”, note that he does not downgrade
his rights to make the claim. This is clearly searching for uptake of the de-
scription, and in overlap Madeline had been on her way to providing some
sort of evaluation (line 19). But now she is in a sequential position where, as
Heritage (2002) suggested, she is vulnerable to being heard as merely echo-
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ing in her agreement or agreeing out of coercion. Therefore, if she is to be
heard as having a position that is not entirely interactionally generated, some
sort of evaluation is relevant.
Thus, when Madeline confirms through a modified repeat, she does
work to assert that whether the description of the gun control policy is in-
teresting is properly within her domain, where her claim to primary rights
appears to be rooted in her interactional role as the recipient of the telling.
Further, she works to assert that it is not only her place to do this but that
she, as the recipient, has greater epistemic authority to assess whether it is
interesting. This case, similar to Extract 15 and several others we have ob-
served, further evidences that claims of primacy are frequently rooted in
social or interactional roles. Here, the interactional role that appears rele-
vant is Madeline’s role as a recipient, and the assertion was one that be-
longs properly to the recipient: an assessment of the telling. In summary,
once again the full repeat is positioned in an environment where the prior
speaker has straightforwardly made a claim. The second speaker relies on
the full modified repeat to override the first assertion and thus to reclaim
primary rights normally associated with being “first.” Once again, at issue
is the relative social positioning of the interactants. It is not simply a matter
of whether they are aligned that the telling is interesting but that the terms
of that alignment are negotiated such that the recipient of the telling has
greater rights and greater epistemic authority to assess whether what was
reported in the telling was interesting.
As a final example, see Extract 17. Here, a teenage girl, Virginia, has
requested a raise in her allowance during a family dinner. In lines 1 to 2,
Virginia assesses $5 a week as a ridiculous (i.e., ridiculously low) amount.
In line 4, Prudence, the girlfriend of Virginia’s older brother, asserts that
this amount is a lot. After Prudence laughs, Virginia’s mother responds to
this assertion. First, she repeats the target assessable “FIve Dollars a
WEE:k?,” which helps to relink her turn to Virginia’s (line 1) and further
acts to target the action of the remainder of the turn (Schegloff, 1996b).
This also gives the mother’s turn stronger rhetorical force as she builds her
case in confirmation of Prudence’s more mitigated assertion. Subsequently
she adds the increment “Jus’ to throw away:,”. Although not an overt asser-
tion, this recasts the $5 allowance less as “allowance” and more as “play
money”. The prosody of both line 7 and the increment in line 9 is rising and
in this context further indicates that this is something to be commented on.
This comment comes in the form of an emphatic “my gosh” and then the
full modified repeat “it is a lo:t.”.7
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(17) Virginia 02:15 ((Recorded during the 1970s))
1 VIR: A(h)llo::wan(h)ce? I o(h)nly g(h)et fi(h)ve
2 d(h)ollars a week.That’s rid(h)i(h)c()ul(h)ous.
3 ???: .hh
4 PRU: [£(Well) that seems like ] a lo(h)o(h)ot! heh! uh! .hhh!=
5 MOM: [( )]
6 PRU: =[I(h) n(h)e |ver g(h)ot that| mu:ch ],
7 MOM: =[F I v e |  D o l l a r s | a WEE:]k?,=
8 VIR: =W[u-
9 MOM: [Jus’ to throw away:, my gosh it is a lo:t.
Unlike other full modified repeats, here the initial speaker’s initial claim is
epistemically downgraded with “seems like”, which displays a possible
orientation to having subordinate rights to make the claim. However, note
that there are several important differences with this case. First, the initial
claim is positioned as a disaligning response to Virginia’s assessment of
her allowance amount as “ridiculous” (line 2). Thus, the smile voice, the
well preface, and the evidential downgrade of the turn may be primarily
dealing with the disagreement. Second, and closely related, unlike the
other cases, here the first speaker’s claim is delivered to another addressee
(i.e., to Virginia rather than to Mom), and the second speaker (i.e., Mom)
here is capitalizing on that. Third, the sequential position of this second
makes a full (rather than a partial) modified repeat very close to mandatory
for comprehensibility. That is, although it is in an adjacent turn, it is rather
more distal than our other cases.8
The mother’s claim to have primary rights here indexes a similar social
role to that of the teacher we saw earlier insofar as her role as the mother and
the money provider is here instantiated with this practice, but this case is also
not unlike Extracts 14 and 15, where the second speaker had previously im-
plied thispositionbut,byvirtueofgoing“second”, isat riskof losingprimary
rightsover thisdomain.Thus, althoughPrudenceandMomare inagreement,
when Mom does a modified repeat, she addresses the terms of that agreement
and works to reclaim primary rights over the domain of Virginia’s allowance.
Further, the emphasis on the claim once again is hearable as asserting greater
epistemic authority over the claim as well. We see then that, perhaps to a
greater extent here, on one level Mom and Prudence are aligned against Vir-
giniaandinthatsenseareputtingVirginia inherplace.However,withthemod-
ified repeat, Mom asserts the priority of her own position and authority over
Prudence, thereby putting Prudence in her place as well.
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This section has focused on full modified repeats as a way of doing
confirmation of a matter. It was observed at the outset of this section that as
an action the production of a confirmation in this position is marked be-
cause it was not conditionally relevant by the prior turn. By doing con-
firmation, and by doing it with a modified repeat (i.e., redoing an original
assertion with an expanded and stressed copula/auxiliary), the speaker un-
dermines the primacy that was claimed by the first speaker and asserts his
or her own authority to make the claim from second position.
DISCUSSION
In this article I show that modified repeats are a way of doing confir-
mation that, through the redoing of a just prior claim, undermines the prior
speaker’s claim of primacy and instead asserts the second speaker as hav-
ing primary rights to make the claim and his or her own epistemic authority
over the matter. Modified resayings index interactional or social grounds
through which the second speaker, rather than the first, is “the one” who
has greater epistemic authority over the assertion. I argue that this is ac-
complished first because, in contrast to most confirmations, these are not
restricted to sequential environments where confirmation is generally con-
ditionally relevant. Further, this practice relies on (a) stress of an expanded
copula/auxiliary, which communicates to a hearer to look backward to
some prior utterance; (b) lexical repetition; and (c) the removal of any
epistemic downgrades. It was observed that two main types of modified re-
peats were used and that they occur in qualitatively different environments.
Partial modified repeats are generally positioned following initial claims
where the speaker has oriented to their own diminished rights to make the
claim. Full modified repeats are typically positioned following initial
claims where the speaker has asserted a claim straightforwardly and thus
has not oriented to his or her own rights as subordinate. The full repeat is a
stronger action because it asserts primary rights in an environment where
this was not previously credited, whereas partial repeats collaborate with
the prior speaker in his or her orientation to having subordinate rights to
make claims about the matter at hand.
As a type of response, I argue that modified repeats are a marked way
of aligning (in contrast with, e.g., “Yeah”) and thus ask hearers to under-
stand them as doing special work. This then is in line with a theoretical po-
sition asserted by Levinson (1987, 2000), which claims that one way
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interactants economize is to allow metalinguistic properties of an utterance
to carry a message. He claimed that one way this is achieved is that utter-
ances can have default forms that are attached to default interpretations. I
do not mean here to invoke a claim of essentialism. Rather, I mean to sug-
gest that the practice here may be part of a larger interactional organization
whereby a nonminimal or marked usage (as evidenced by what has been
shown here) can implicate a particular sort of response. Levinson’s argu-
ment suggests that marked usages violate certain Gricean maxims. In this
case, the maxim of quantity (and the related maxim of minimization dis-
cussed by Levinson, 1987) is breached insofar as “Yeah” is shorter and is
all that is necessary to align. Thus, doing more than “Yeah”, however align-
ing the action is, may be heard by the interactant as doing “more” than mere
agreement. A modified repeat then signals that the situation is not business
as usual and that the hearer can and should look for what the speaker may
be taking issue with, and on what grounds. Here, the issue is competing for
primary rights to make a claim that has just been made by another.
This research contributes to a larger set of findings that shows social
interaction to be very much concerned with something we might broadly
identify as the building and maintaining of social relations. Maynard and
Zimmerman (1984) pointed to a variety of ways in which “participants pre-
serve an attitude of respect, if not reverence toward each other’s ‘self’”
(Maynard & Zimmerman, 1984). Related, Heritage and Raymond (2005)
drew on Goffman’s concept of the ways in which different sorts of territo-
rial preserves are “patrolled and defended by the claimant” (Goffman,
1971, p. 52) to argue that there is evidence within conversation that partici-
pants patrol and defend information preserves. Specifically, they argued
that the rights parties have to particular information is part of their own
knowledge territories. The findings I report in this article are very much in
line with those of Heritage and Raymond (2005) but allow us to go one step
farther, as the instances focused on here were generally claims about some
state of affairs that did not make agreement or confirmation conditionally
relevant. Interactants could be seen to be concerned with their social posi-
tioning not only when an assessment or confirmation was due but also in
terms of claiming rights to make assertions about matters when this was not
specifically sequentially implicated.
This is potentially interesting if we consider that how language is be-
ing used in social interaction provides us with information about what lan-
guage was designed to do (Dunbar, 1996, 1998, 2003). Many studies of so-
cial interaction have offered evidence that linguistic devices are being used
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to navigate and position the interactants relative to one another. In some
cases this positioning is with respect to whether they are in agreement
about a given matter. There are a number of practices that reflect social in-
teraction to be biased to at least support, if not promote, social solidarity
among interactants (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Heritage, 1984b). However,
interactants are not only concerned to be in agreement. Often it is much
more complex and relational than that. For instance, in response to a yes/no
question, if a speaker is going to respond affirmatively, he or she has alter-
native turn designs available to do this. These alternative designs (e.g., ver-
sions of “yes”; “Oh yes”; “of course”; or partial or full repeats of the turn,
to name a few) deal not with agreement per se but with other aspects of how
the respondent is positioned with respect to the questioner (Heritage, 1998;
Raymond, 2003; Schegloff, 1996a). Who has rights to know what with how
much authority?
This is precisely what is at issue in the practice discussed here but also
in a great many of the social interaction practices thus far identified and de-
scribed. Modified repeats are a practice through which speakers manage
not just what is known but, most important, who has rights to know more
about what; this appears to be central for the participants in managing both
their reputations (and thus their territories) and their relationships with one
another (and hence where they stand relative to one another). Thus, as we
inch closer to the development of a theory of social interaction, we must ac-
count for existing observations that conversation appears to be fundamen-
tally designed to promote alignment (through its turn-taking organization
and its sequential organizations) and that it is concerned with issues of
sociorelational positioning.
NOTES
1 For a review of the functions of phrasal stress offered from a linguistic perspective, see
Bolinger (1989) and Ladd (1980, 1983).
2 Note that with this full repeat, the speaker resists the terms of the question. That is, the
customer does not provide a “Yes” answer, which would conform to the terms of the
question (Raymond, 2003). Rather, the customer treats the terms of the question as
somehow ill-fitted. In this case what is ill-fitted about it is likely that the information
was already implied by the prior speaker and thus did not need to be stated explicitly
(Schegloff, 1996a).
3 The “you” here appears to be the generic “one” as in “one could see them on the TV.”
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4 Note that a possible exploitation of this practice can occur if it is used when no grounds
for primary rights can be found. In these cases it appears that the second speaker is not
primarily asserting his/her superior rights but quarreling with their having been treated
as having inferior rights by virtue of going “second.”
5 Unlike other cases, this confirmation is delayed both by a 0.2-second silence and a
turn-initial “Well”. Although Margot and Madeline are agreeing that the hill would be
difficult to bike, Margot’s assertion is slightly ill-fitted and possibly disaligning.
Madeline had been making a case about the deficiencies of southern California city
planning. Thus, her complaint about not biking has to do with the fact that it is unsafe
(due to no bike lanes). That it might be difficult to do could be heard as supporting the
city’s implicit position against bike lanes—no one would use them if they were there
because the city is too hilly. It therefore appears that the delays here have to do with
Madeline’s resistance of this dimension of Margot’s assertion.
6 This allows us to see that Extract 11 is less competitive than it could have been had it in-
volved a full repeat.
7 Although the mother’s reassertion is positioned after a TCU by Prudence (line 6), an-
other one by the mother (line 7) and an increment to that TCU (line 9) before the excla-
mation “my gosh”, which prefaces the repeat like other adjacently positioned repeats,
here the positioning remains in an adjacent turn although not otherwise immediately ad-
jacent (i.e., turn final in T1 and turn initial in T2). Still, the adjacent turns allow the
recipient of the second turn to be arguably in a position to make sense of “my gosh it is”
in a way that in a nonadjacent turn such a partial repeat would no longer be easily
retrievable.
8 Full modified repeats can also be observed in distal sequential environments. For in-
stance, in a pediatric encounter, physicians can be observed to use this as a way of con-
firming a parent’s candidate diagnosis (e.g., “It is impetigo” or “He does have an ear in-
fection”; Stivers, 2000). Its function however is not clearly the same as that of
adjacently positioned modified repeats, so these instances will be worked up separately.
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